Financial liberalization in China has progressed steadily over the last decade. Capital controls have become less e¤ective and can no longer provide long lasting protections against capital in ‡ows ( Prasad and Wei, 2005) . Moreover, reforms in the banking sector highlight the transformation of the Chinese economy from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one (Mo, 1999; Woo, 2002; Barnett, 2004) . Greater decision-making autonomy have been granted to the banking sector, and ‡uctuations in bank lending now have major implications for the macroeconomic situation (Hu, 2003) even if the e¢ ciency of the banking sector remains low (Allen et al., 2005; Yao et al., 2007) . As a result, the magnitude and the nature of capital in ‡ows in China has changed greatly. Nonforeign direct investment capital in ‡ows can henceforth fuel the Chinese …nancial system and provide excess liquidity to the banking sector. This led to a classic con ‡ict between internal and external balances under a …xed exchange rate system.
Over the last decade, China recorded strong current account surpluses and strong net foreign direct investment (FDI) in ‡ows. Prasad and Wei (2005) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II brie ‡y reviews causes and implications of the upsurge in international reserves. Section III presents the empirical assessment of monetary stability. Section IV investigates the management of net foreign assets. Section V concludes.
2 Causes and implications of the upsurge in international reserves
Hot money in ‡ows in China
The RMB has been convertible for current account transactions since 1996, but …nancial account transactions are still under control (Xiaopu, 2003; Yongding, 2004) : portfolio investments are constrained, foreign direct investments are oriented and main short term capital in ‡ows are forbidden. Nevertheless, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not fully isolated from hot money in ‡ows. Capital controls are not applied to each category of capital account transactions -several are free or loosely managed (Xie, 2004) 2 .
The balance of payments roughly records the net amount of hot money in ‡ows (Tung and Baker, 2004; Rzepkowski, 2004; Genberg et al., 2005; Prasad and Wei, 2005) . In Table F which contrasts with illegal capital out ‡ows noticed during the 1990's (Gunter, 2004) .
Hot money is mainly held by overseas Chinese (Chinese diaspora, mainly from Taiwan),
Chinese banks converting their foreign assets into RMB assets and depositors in the Chinese banking system stopping the accumulation of foreign currency deposits McCauley 2003, 2004; Rzepkowski, 2004 and $53.13 billion) during these two years. Hence, the rapid accumulation of international 3 The evolution of the errors and omissions category may also in part re ‡ect an accounting issue related to changes in the dollar value of foreign assets (Prasad and Wei, 2005) . The US interest rate could be an important factor in explaining these hot money in ‡ows.
The US interest rate decreased strongly in 2001 and remained low until 2005, whereas the Chinese interest rate has been roughly stable over this period. In addition, exchange rate expectations could constitute a second important factor in explaining hot money in ‡ows. The PBC applied a …xed exchange rate against the US dollar up to July 2005, but speculation on RMB appreciation has been increasing in parallel to the general dollar weakness and the trade imbalance between the US and China. The o¤shore interest rate implied by the markets for non-deliverable forwards (NDF) in Asian currency underlines this issue Fung et al., 2004) 4 .
According to Goldstein and Lardy (2003) and Tung and Baker (2004) , the PBC could have implemented a 15% revaluation of the RMB but speculators can no longer expect anymore such a large one-o¤ revaluation. The new exchange rate arrangement announced in July 2005 makes clear that the PBC will move gradually toward more exchange rate ‡exibility. The PBC announced a 2.1% appreciation of the RMB against the dollar and a move to a managed ‡oat with reference to a basket of currencies. This new exchange rate arrangement is heavily managed, the PBC allows a daily trading band of +/-0.3% around the exchange rate announced the day before. The remaining concerns are how China might continue its move toward more exchange rate ‡exibility and how China might undertake the liberalization of its capital account (Eichengreen, 2004; Obstfeld, 2006)
The US interest rate has been rising since mid- 
International reserves and monetary stability
The following equations show how domestic credit might be a¤ected by an upsurge in international reserves. The equilibrium condition in the money market is provided by the LM curve. The money demand results from a transaction motive and a speculative motive. The money supply is endogenous and its two counterparts are domestic credit and international reserves. The equilibrium in the money market is de…ned by
where P t is the domestic price level, IR t the international reserves, DC t the domestic credit, y t the output, i t the real interest rate on domestic bonds and L(:) the money demand function with L y (:) > 0 and L i (:) < 0 6 .
Assuming simpli…ed commercial bank balance sheets, where liabilities consist of deposits and where assets consist of required reserves, loans and bonds (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990) , the bank lending level is given by
5 We can notice in Table 1 Assuming a simpli…ed central bank balance sheet where assets consist of net foreign assets (N F A t ) and net domestic assets (N DA t ) and where the liability consists of the monetary base, the money multiplier theory de…nes deposits as
where M B t = N F A t + N DA t is the monetary base and the currency-demand deposit ratio.
In a …xed exchange rate system, changes in net foreign assets are determined by net capital in ‡ows and the current account
where CA t is the current account balance, q t the domestic real exchange rate, E t (q t+1 ) q t the real expected depreciation of the domestic currency, i t the US real interest rate on bonds, t the risk premium and the extent of capital controls. NK(:) represents net capital in ‡ows and depends positively on deviation from uncovered real interest rate parity (q t E t (q t+1 ) + i t i t t ) 7 . 7 We assume that purchasing power parity holds so that there is no Balassa Samuelson e¤ect. The bank lending level is therefore given by
Equations (1), (4) and (5) show how international reserves can a¤ect monetary conditions. Equation (4) 
Data and VECM speci…cation
Endogenous variables used in the …rst speci…cation of the VECM are real gross international reserves less gold (IR t ), real domestic credit (DC t ), real industrial production (y t ) and the Chinese real interest rate (r t ). Due to data availability of the Chinese interest rate, the sample starts in January 1997 (we use the IFS, ARIC and EcoWin databases). The real interest rate di¤erential between China and the US (r t r t ) and gross domestic product (GDP) at constant prices (y We conclude that all the variables are non-stationary in level but stationary in …rst-di¤erence (these tests are available upon request). The VECM speci…cation is therefore
where
where r is the number of cointegration relation, 0 is a (r 4) matrix and the error vector The matrix contains the cointegrating vectors and the matrix contains the weights attached to the cointegrating relations in the individual equations of the model. The model is estimated with two lags (k = 2) in order to achieve normality (Jarque-Bera test)
and independence (LM test) of residuals. A lag exclusion (Wald) test is also implemented and we …nd that the third lag can be excluded (Table 2) .
If there is only one cointegrating relation (r = 1), this relation can be written as
where ec t 1 is the error-correction term, i.e. the deviation from the long run equilibrium.
The Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration method is used to estimate equation (6). This method allows one to test for the number of cointegrating vectors using a trace test. However, this test could lead to an over rejection of the no cointegration hypothesis due to the …nite sample bias and the possible cointegration rank inconstancy. Consequently, backward and forward recursive trace tests are implemented to investigate the cointegrating rank stability. Moreover, the trace test statistic is corrected for the …nite sample bias as suggested by Reinsel and Ahn (1992) and Reimers (1991) 10 . The trace test with the …nite sample bias correction supports the existence of one cointegrating vector at the 5% level over the whole sample (Table 2 , column 1 ). This result is con…rmed by the maximum eigenvalue test (Table 2 , column 1 ). The backward recursive trace test 11 (Figure 1a) supports the existence of one cointegrating vector at the 10% level but this test also shows instabilities in the cointegrating vector in the baseline sample. The trace statistic decreases 
Estimated cointegrating vectors
The coe¢ cient of DC t is normalized to one to represent the cointegrating vector as a reduced equation for real domestic credit. Real international reserves exhibit a negative relationship with real domestic credit. The coe¢ cient associated with real international reserves is high in absolute value (-0.622). Restrictions on this coe¢ cient can be tested with a LR test (the null hypothesis is that restrictions are not rejected). We …nd that this coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from 0 and not signi…cantly di¤erent from -1 (Table 2) at the 10% level. This suggests that the central bank would have managed the accumulation 12 The cointegrating relation présented in equation (7) can be written as
11 Real industrial production exhibits a positive relationship with real domestic credit.
The coe¢ cient associated with real industrial production index is high (2.901) in this …rst speci…cation, and therefore suggests a strong pro-cyclical evolution of domestic credit. The LR test supports at the 10% level that this coe¢ cient is di¤erent from 0 ( Table 2 ).
The Chinese real interest rate exhibits a positive relationship with real domestic credit which seems counter-intuitive and the LR test supports at the 10% level that this coe¢ cient is di¤erent from 0. However, variable r t could re ‡ect the capital ‡ight e¤ect. Indeed, the interest rate liberalization has been gradual over the last decade (Mo, 1999; GarciaHerrero et al., 2006) . This gradual switch from administrative measures to market-oriented measures is not completed; moreover the functioning of the banking system is not very sensitive yet to market practices. The …nancial integration of China with the rest of the world is also an ongoing process, but this might a¤ect domestic monetary conditions more. Cheung et al. (2003) …nd evidence for …nancial integration between China and the US, which con…rms the erosion of capital controls. A rise in the domestic real interest rate could therefore lead to capital in ‡ows which in turn could positively a¤ect the growth of real domestic credit and real international reserves. In speci…cation 2 , the real interest rate di¤erential between China and the US (r t r t ) is used instead of Chinese real interest rate (r t ). This cointegrating vector is given by (r t r t ) 9:022 + ec t : This speci…cation is more appropriate for taking into account the capital ‡ight e¤ect. The coe¢ cient associated with real international reserves is lower in absolute value (-0.341) in this speci…cation. In addition the LR test shows that this coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from 0 and also signi…cantly di¤erent from -1 ( Table 2 ). The accumulation of real international reserves could have therefore led to partial downward adjustments in real domestic credit.
In speci…cations 3 and 4 (Table 2 ), a GDP monthly estimate (obtained with the Chow and Line (1971) method, see footnote 9) is used instead of the real industrial production index. Speci…cation 3 is estimated with the Chinese real interest rate (r t ) and speci…cation 4 is estimated with the real interest rate di¤erential between China and the US (r t r t ). The GDP monthly estimate does not seem to improve the measurement of economic activity. The trace statistic over the whole sample does not reject the no cointegration hypothesis at the 10% level (Table 2) . Speci…cations 3 and 4 are also estimated with three lags because the lag exclusion test in Table 2 shows that the third lag is signi…cant at the 5% level (these estimations are available upon request). However, these speci…cations with three lags do not allow one to reject the no cointegration hypothesis at the 10% level. As a result, the GDP monthly estimate does not provide an interesting alternative to represent economic activity, and real industrial production is used in the next speci…cations.
In speci…cations 5 and 6 ( 
Speci…cation 6 is estimated with the real interest rate di¤erential between China and the 13 
The joint weak exogeneity hypothesis in all individual equations except in the real domestic credit equation is supported (LR test in Table 2 ) at the 1% level in speci…cation 5 but not at the 5% level. It is supported at the 10% level in speci…cation 6 . As a result, we can conclude with speci…cation 6 that real domestic credit is the only variable which responds to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The adjustment coe¢ cient on the errorcorrection term in the real domestic credit equation ( dc in Table 2 ) is negative (-0.0742
in speci…cation 5 and -0.1007 in speci…cation 6 ) and signi…cant at the 5% level which is consistent with equilibrium correction behavior. The cointegrating vector represents therefore the long run determination of real domestic credit since other variables are weakly exogenous. When the error-correction term is positive, due for example to a rise in real international reserves, real domestic credit decreases to reach its equilibrium value. The speed of adjustment is equal to one minus the …rst order autoregressive coe¢ cient of the error-correction term (Phylaktis and Kassimatis, 1994) . We …nd that 28% in speci…cation 5 and 36% in speci…cation 6 of the gap between real domestic credit and its equilibrium level is eliminated every month. As a result, a given deviation in the cointegrating relation is reduced to 90% of its original amount in 7.10 months in speci…cation 5 and in 5.16 months in speci…cation 6 13 .
In speci…cations 7 and 8 , the homogeneity hypothesis between real international reserves (IR t ) and real domestic credit (DC t ) is added to the weak exogeneity hypothesis 
The LR test does not supports these speci…cations at the 1% level (Table 2 ) and we cannot therefore accept the homogeneity restriction between real international reserves and real domestic credit. As a result, the PBC succeeded in slowing down real domestic credit when real international reserves increased but the homogeneity tests in speci…cations 7 and 8
show that it was insu¢ cient to fully o¤set the accumulation of international reserves. This led to loose monetary conditions in China, even if the PBC succeeded in keeping real domestic credit under control. Figure 3 displays the error-correction term corresponding to speci…cation 6 . The errorcorrection term is scaled so that the deviations from the long run equilibrium level average zero over the sample period 14 . It is clear from Figure 3 that the error-correction term is a stationary process. Deviations from the horizontal axis might be interpreted as deviations from the long run equilibrium. When the error correction term is above the horizontal axis, real domestic credit is above its long run equilibrium level implied by the model. In particular, the error correction term is above the horizontal axis in 2003 and 2004 when 14 In speci…cation 6 , the error-correction term (ec t ) is de…ned as ec t = DC t + 0:299IR t 1:831y t 0:021(r t r t ) + 8:324 where the constant term 8.324 is computed so that the average of ec t is zero. The value of these coe¢ cients increases or decreases over time, which explains instabilities in the cointegrating relation exhibited by the recursive trace tests. The coe¢ cients of the real industrial production (Figure 4a ) and of the interest rate di¤erential (Figure 4b ) are constitently signi…cant and increase gradually over the sample period, respectively from 1.50 to 2.00 and from 0.01 to 0.02. The coe¢ cient of the real international reserves ( Figure   4c ) also increases gradually (in absolute value) from -0.10 to -0.30 but the two times standard error band is above the horizontal axis before 2004. Adjustment coe¢ cient dc (Figure 4d ) decreases gradually (in absolute value) from -0.16 to -0.10, which suggests that the deviations from the long term equilibrium became more persistent. These recursive estimations do not exhibit structural breaks in the cointegrating relation but rather the convergence of the estimated coe¢ cients toward their long term value when the sample is increases.
Impulse responses
Impulse responses are used to analyze the dynamic interactions between variables and more precisely between real international reserves and real domestic credit. We use speci…ca-tion 6 to implement these impulse responses. First, we implement a system Sequential Estimation of Regressors (SER) procedure in order to test restrictions for the short run parameters 15 . This strategy allows one to …t a subset model, removing insigni…cant coef- First, we consider a shock in real domestic credit (Figure 5a ). Other variables do not respond signi…cantly, and so this shock is transitory. The adjustment force ( dc ) pushes real domestic credit back to its equilibrium level. The two times standard error band intersects with the horizontal axis after 16 periods. Second, we consider a shock in real international reserves ( Figure 5b ). Real domestic credit reacts negatively and signi…cantly to this shock, but the two times standard error band intersects with the horizontal axis after 8 periods (Figure 5c ). This impulse response therefore supports the negative relationship between real international reserves and real domestic credit estimated in the cointegrating vector.
The PBC adjusts real domestic credit downward when real international reserves increase to stabilize domestic monetary conditions, but this adjustment has a limited scale. Real industrial production also reacts signi…cantly to the shock in real international reserves and exhibits a positive impulse response (Figure 5d ). The positive shock in international 
The management of net foreign assets
In a …xed exchange rate system, hot money in ‡ows lead the central bank to accumulate international reserves. As a result, net foreign assets (NFA) in the central bank balance sheet expand. Open market operations, reserve requirements and window guidance are the main instruments used by policymakers to manage the consequences of these capital in ‡ows on the domestic monetary sector 17 .
16 Shocks in real industrial production and in the real interest rate di¤erential are not displayed. They lead to a positive and signi…cant response of real domestic credit. These impulse responses are available upon request. 17 Monetary authorities can also directly in ‡uence demand and supply in the foreign exchange market in order to manage hot money in ‡ows. Lu (2004) examines measures taken by Chinese authorities to ease appreciation pressures on the RMB. Nevertheless, the liberalization of capital out ‡ows could be counterproductive, since this could stimulate further in ‡ows . 
The sterilization policy
The PBC used open market operations to sterilize hot money in ‡ows. Central bank bills were issued while treasury bonds were managed to drive the money market interest rate (Xie, 2004; Green, 2005) . Central bank bills are recorded as liabilities in the central bank balance sheet but they are frequently merged with net other assets (NOA) to simplify the central bank balance sheet (Hu, 2003) 18 . raised the banks' reserve requirements ratio from 6% to 7.5%. The PBC sought in this way to reduce the money multiplier in order to drain liquidity. Furthermore, the PBC 18 Central bank bills can therefore be recorded negatively as net other assets and the central bank balance sheet is resumed by the relation:
where N DA t are net domestic assets, N F A t are net foreign assets, N OA t are net other assets and M B t is reserve money. implemented window guidance to curb new lending (Hagiwara, 2004; Green, 2005) . The PBC directly intervened in the lending of speci…c banks to speci…c sectors. Since the four biggest banks -accounting for 69% of total bank deposits and 72% of total bank loansare state-owned banks, bank instructions have been e¢ cient (Hu, 2003) .
Direct causality tests
The management of international reserves by the PBC is investigated with Granger causality tests on vector autoregressive (VAR) models. This speci…cation without explicit theoretical ground is appropriate insofar as the PBC widely used, in a discretionary way, its control over the banking sector. The state-owned banks were used as sterilization bond buyers and also to implement the window guidance (Hu, 2003; Roubini and Setser, 2005a; Koivu, 2005) . Thus, even if the banking sector obtained greater decision-making autonomy in its relations with …rms during the last decade, the central bank kept the ability to directly intervene in the banking sector in order to ensure the stability of monetary conditions. This approach with VAR models therefore allows one to investigate the e¢ ciency of sterilization when various monetary measures at various times in various intensities have been used (Takagi and Esaka, 2001 ).
We analyse with Granger causality tests wether net foreign assets non sterilized by open market operations (NFOA) a¤ect the monetary sector. These tests allow one to investigate wether reserve requirements and window guidance have been e¤ective in completing the sterilization process. We use the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolato and Lutkepohl (1996) procedure. This procedure does not require a cointegration analysis and allows one to mix orders of integration processes. This procedure is implemented in two steps. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w the lag length (k) of a VAR system in stationary form. Second, we estimate a VAR in level with p = k + dmax lags. Granger causality tests consist in applying standard Wald tests to the …rst k VAR coe¢ cient matrix.
We consider several VAR systems. First, we consider two bivariate systems including NFOA and broad money (M2) or domestic credit. Second, we consider two multivariate systems including real NFOA, real industrial production, the Chinese real interest rate and real broad money or real domestic credit. Real industrial production and the Chinese real interest rate are taken into account in these systems, which allows one to check the robustness of the results obtained with bivariate systems. Finally, we consider a trivariate system including NFOA, broad money and domestic credit in order to take into account interactions between broad money and domestic credit.
We use the log transformation of index variable (January 1997=100) for all variables except the Chinese real interest rate. In addition, VAR systems are estimated using monthly data from January 1997 to March 2006. Four unit root tests are implemented: ADF, DF-GLS, Phillips-Perron and KPSS. We conclude that all variables are non-stationary in levels but stationary in …rst-di¤erences (these tests are available upon request). The optimal lag order of the VAR system in stationary form is chosen according to residual statistical properties (normality and independence). We conclude that each system needs three lags and we take into account dummies 19 to get normality in the residuals. As a result, we estimate VAR systems in level with 4 lags and Granger causality is tested with restrictions placed on lagged terms up to the third lag. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 operations. These operations were provided banks with their main opportunity to get out of excess liquidity (Roubini and Setser, 2005a) . Figure 7b shows the recursive causality tests from NFOA to domestic credit. We conclude at the 10% level that NFOA did not
Granger cause domestic credit in the three estimated VAR systems. Hence, open market operations combined with window guidance enabled the curbing of credit growth and so the PBC succeeded in keeping domestic credit under control.
Indirect causality tests
NFOA could all the same indirectly a¤ect domestic credit. Figure 7c displays the forward recursive causality tests between broad money and domestic credit in the trivariate VAR system. We conclude that there is a bidirectional causality between these two variables even if the causality from domestic credit to broad money is not systematically con…rmed by the recursive procedure. As a consequence, NFOA does not help to predict domestic credit one period ahead, but can still cause domestic credit several periods ahead with indirect impacts via broad money.
Such indirect causality is investigated following Dufour et al. (2005) . The trivariate VAR model written at time t + 1 is established by
where t = 0; :::; T 1;
, is a 3x1 constant vectors and the error vector e t is such that E(e t ) = 0, E(e t e 0 s ) = 0 if t 6 = s and E(e t e 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Equation (14) represents a VAR model at horizon one. This model can be expanded to become an autoregressive process at horizon h. As suggesting by Dufour et al. (2005) , we consider the following unrestricted model
where h < T and ' 0 = I:
The Granger causality is tested at horizon h applying standard Wald tests to the …rst 3 VAR coe¢ cient matrix (but not all lagged coe¢ cients). Besides, we use the heteroskedasticityautocorrelation consistent estimator developed by Newey and West (1987) to deal with the MA(h-1) error process. The cost of this simple procedure is a loss of e¢ ciency, since the unrestricted estimated model does not use all information. The highest horizon we need to examine is h = 4(= 1x3 + 1) according to Dufour and Renault (1998) : we have one auxiliary variable (M2), the lag order of the VAR system in stationary form is three and direct causality corresponds to h = 1.
Figure 7d displays recursive indirect causality tests from NFOA to domestic credit. We conclude that NFOA did not indirectly Granger cause domestic credit at the 10% level.
The indirect causality test at horizon 3 is signi…cant at the 10% level at the beginning of the recursive procedure, but this result is not robust after January 2004. Open market operations and window guidance therefore allowed the PBC to manage direct and indirect (via the loose liquidity conditions) e¤ects of net foreign assets on domestic credit. 
Costs of the sterilization policy
Several costs resulting from the PBC sterilization policy have been highlighted (Roubini and Setser, 2005a-b; Goldstein and Lardy, 2005) . First, the PBC used the state-owned banks as sterilization bonds buyers. Although these bonds pay more than the 1% associated with excess reserves, banks face a pro…tability issue. Sterilization bond yield is close to the one on deposits, and excess reserves result from quantitative constraints on bank lending. Consequently, the sterilization policy worsened the banking system's weaknesses.
Second, reserves management did not cause a pro…tability issue for the PBC insofar as its sterilization costs are largely o¤set by interest income on its reserves portfolio. Nevertheless, the PBC is threatened with an exchange rate risk and will face capital losses following an exchange rate revaluation. Roubini and Setser (2005a) estimate that a 33% RMB appreciation in 2004 would have represented a $150 billion loss which corresponds to 10% of China's GDP. The PBC, that is taxpayers, is therefore exposed to the potential cost of the current sterilization policy. Lastly, sterilization measures can promote additional capital in ‡ows since they limit the narrow and broad money expansions and therefore keep the level of domestic interest rates high. These additional capital in ‡ows only occur when market participants consider that a higher risk premium on domestic assets does not o¤set these higher interest rates (Takagi and Esaka, 2001 ).
These costs associated with the upsurge in net foreign assets justify China's move toward greater exchange rate ‡exibility in July 2005. This evolution is most apt to temper the excess of the domestic …nancial system, and will enhance the ability of the PBC to tailor money and credit conditions to domestics needs (Eichengreen, 2004; Obstfeld, 2006) . and indirect causality tests show that the sterilization policy implemented by the PBC allowed to manage the e¤ects of net foreign assets on domestic credit, even if the upsurge in international reserves led to excess liquidity. However, the sterilization policy was costly and it was not sustainable in the long run for the banking sector. Consequently, the PBC decided to make a shift in its currency policy. It announced a 2.1% appreciation of the RMB against the dollar and a move to a managed ‡oat with reference to a basket of currencies in July 2005. This evolution is most apt to temper the excesses of the domestic …nancial system and will enhance the ability of the PBC to tailor money and credit conditions to domestics needs (Eichengreen, 2004 The series retrieved from the ARIC database are international reserves (total reserves minus gold), the consumer price index (CPI), the industrial production index (IPI), the three-month interbank real interest rate, the gross domestic product. The price series has been seasonally adjusted by the Census X-12 routine (with multiplicative factors on the levels).
The series retrieved from the EcoWin database is the Libor 3 month interest rate. The series retrieved from IFS are the US consumer price index, domestic credit, broad money (money plus quasi-money), net foreign assets and net other assets in the PBC balance sheet. Series from monetary authorities, banking institutions and banking surveys are interpolated from quarterly data before 1999.
We use the log transformation of index variable (January 1997=100) for all variables except interest rates. The original data on domestic credit and international reserves are modi…ed. First, the $45 billions used to recapitalize two national banks are added to international reserves in order to have a good speci…cation of the accumulation of international reserves. Second, data on domestic credit showed a strong break in January 2002 corresponding to a 13% monthly growth rate whereas it was around 1% during 2001. We therefore consider a 1% monthly growth rate in January 2002. These two modi…cations allow one to obtain residual normality without the introduction of dummy variables. Note 1: According to equation (7), speci…cation 1 is de…ned as :
DC t = ir IR t y y t r r t 1 + ec t = 0:62IR t + 2:90y t + 0:07r t 13:69 + ec t Note 2: The speed of adjustment is equal to one minus the …rst order autoregressive coe¢ cient of the error-correction term (ec t ). The 90% adjustment is equal to ln(0.10)/ln(1-s) where s is the speed of adjustment (Phylaktis and Kassimatis, 1994 Note 1: The speed of adjustment is equal to one minus the …rst order autoregressive coe¢ cient of the error-correction term (ec t ). The 90% adjustment is equal to ln(0.10)/ln(1-s) where s is the speed of adjustment (Phylaktis and Kassimatis, 1994 Note: The backward recursive trace test checks the cointegrating rank constancy in the baseline sample. Figure 1a has therefore to be read from the right side to the left side. Note: Con…dent intervals represent the 90% studentized Hall intervals based on 1500 bootstrap replications and 100 replications for estimating the variance in each of the outer replication rounds. These impulses responses are computed with JMulti 4.02 (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004) 33 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
